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Data Poisoning Attacks on Informativity for Observability: Invariance-Based Synthesis

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Data Poisoning Attacks on Informativity for Observability: Invariance-Based Synthesis

Authors: Iori Takaki, Ahmet Cetinkaya, Hideaki Ishii Date: 2026-04-13 Paper ID: openalex:2604.11657

Summary

This paper investigates data poisoning attacks targeting informativity-based observability analysis in data-driven control. The authors analyze how invertible linear transformations on finite time-series data matrices can manipulate the invariant subspaces that underpin informativity, potentially invalidating system state observability. A constructive synthesis method is provided alongside feasibility conditions, allowing for the generation of minimum-norm perturbations that degrade observability certificates. Numerical experiments confirm that structured, low-magnitude transformations effectively compromise these data-driven security guarantees.

Key Contributions

  • Introduces a formal framework for cyber attacks on informativity-based observability analysis in data-driven control systems.
  • Demonstrates that invertible linear transformations of data matrices can be used to embed malicious states into the invariant subspace of the dataset.
  • Formulates and solves a minimum-norm optimization problem to compute the smallest data distortion necessary to invalidate informativity certificates.

Metadata & Links

url
https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.11657
paper_id
2604.11657
paper_source
openalex
domain
time-series
tags
architectures
datasets
concept_slugs
dataset_slugs
skill
TimeSeriesSkill
created_at
2026-04-16T05:47:07Z